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the Keeper of the Land Register in relation to the constitution of servitudes by
prescription32 and there seems to be no reason why the same approach could not be
adopted to a Bowers right of access. The bringing of such an action may involve
expense for the developer and involve considerable time. The developer may not
have such time available.33
The issues of obscurity and cost are double edged. There will be nothing in the
Land Register or Sasine Register to indicate the existence, extent, route or exact
nature of the Bowers access right in any particular case. The servient proprietor may
be faced with a claim that such a right exists but he may have little more specification
as to the details of the access. In a sense his land will be subject to blight albeit in a
micro form. Who would buy his land or wish to take any right from him if the land in
question might be subject to a Bowers access? Obviously this pressure point will be
most useful if the servient proprietor himself wishes to develop. However, even if
the servient proprietor does not wish to develop, he faces the prospect of being
engaged in a court battle which he may lose, with all that involves for payment of
court expenses.
I. CONCLUSION
In the field of practice the true value of Bowers v Kennedy is best regarded as a
negotiating tool. In the writer's view it does strengthen the negotiating hand of the
landlocked proprietor to a considerable extent. It is best employed, however, only
when all other title research has been done well, and not as a patch for mistakes.
Quite apart from that practical aspect, however, the First Division is to be com-
mended for taking a bold step which further emphasises the parallels between
Scotland and other mixed jurisdictions such as South Africa.
Roderick R M Paisley
Professor ofCommercial Property Law
University ofAberdeen
32 Registration of Title Practice Book, 2nd edn (2000), paras 6.52-6.59; "In Practice" (1997) 42 JLSS
507 at 508; I Davis, "Positive servitudes and the Land Register" (1999) SLPQ 64; Cusine and Paisley,
Servitudes, paras 6.03 and 10.23. It is doubtful that the Keeper would accept affidavit evidence of
landlocking as sufficient.
33 See, for example, Rubislaw Land Company Limited v Aberdeen Construction Group and Others,




First Thoughts on Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2)
Courts of appeal, as we have been reminded before now, are not law commissions.
Their primary function is simply to consider (and answer) questions of law which
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affect the outcome of a dispute between two parties.1 Nevertheless, there will
inevitably be cases where an appeal court is forced to take a broader view of the
issues before it.
Such a case arose in Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2),2 where a Full Bench of the
High Court recently revisited the doctrine of diminished responsibility. By the time
of the hearing, it was a matter of agreement between counsel for the appellant and
Crown counsel that the established interpretation of the law was incorrect. But
that, it seems, was as far as the position of counsel went. As the Lord Justice-General(Rodger) observed in delivering the opinion of the court:
. . .
both counsel found it much easier to tear down the somewhat fragile structurethat our predecessors had erected than to suggest what we should raise up in its place.
In the end the Solicitor General said that the matter was one of difficulty and that,if the suggestions of counsel did not find favour, we should simply have to do what
we willed. Wafted on some Continental zephyr, the doctrine that the court knows
the law had, apparently, reached our shores. So, duly admonished, we set about ourtask.3
A. INTRODUCTION
Diminished responsibility is a particularly Scottish doctrine, which is generally thought
to have originated in Lord Deas' charge to the jury in Alex Dingwall,4 although its
roots can be traced back somewhat further than that.5 Furthermore, as the High
Court observes in Galbraith, the terminology of "diminished responsibility" can be
found elsewhere prior to its emergence in Scotland.6 The terminology has, in fact,
only recently been fixed in Scotland itself. Lord Rodger is at pains in Galbraith to
point out that no Scottish judge is reported as having used the phrase "diminished
responsibility" itself prior to 1939,7 and although this is incorrect by at least six
years,8 the point—that the doctrine has no fixed, absolute origin—remains a valid
one.
1 See, for example, Attorney-General's Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 per Lord Mustill at
2&5.
2 Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2) 2001 SLT 953 (henceforth Galbraitli).
3 Galbraith, at 939I-J.
4 (1867) 5 Irv466.
5 G H Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 3rd edn, by M G A Christie, (2000), vol 1 at 458-
459.
6 Galbraith, at 959L.
7 Galbraith, at 960B-C, citing Kirkwood v HM Advocate 1939 JC 36 per Lord Justice-General Normand
at 37.
8 See Muir v HM Advocate 1933 JC 46 per Lord Justice-General Clyde at 48. See also HM Advocate
v Ednwnstone 1909 2 SLT 223 per Lord Guthrie at 224: "his responsibility must be held as diminished
by the enfeeblement of his faculties". The reporter's headnote in this case refers to "diminished
responsibility", and this case almost certainly accounts for Lord Keith's observation that he had not
found the term "used by a judge before 1909". See Keith of Avonholm, "Some observations on
diminished responsibility" 1959 JR 109 at 112.
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English law followed the lead of Scots law, introducing the doctrine of diminished
responsibility by statutory reform in 1957.9 Indeed, the doctrine has now travelled
as far as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.10 Yet, despite
its pedigree and its influence, die doctrine has never before been subjected to rigorous
analysis by the High Court on appeal. Galbraith, therefore, is something of a legal
landmark.
B. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Kim Galbraith stood trial for the murder of her husband in 1999. She admitted that
she had shot and killed him, but submitted that she should be convicted of culpable
homicide, rather than murder, on the basis of diminished responsibility. She claimed
that over a number ofyears she had been seriously abused by her husband, who had
threatened to kill her. She had feared for her life and saw no way of bringing an end
to her situation other than killing her husband.
In support of the defence of diminished responsibility, the defence led evidence
from two psychologists. The first concluded that she "had indeed been the victim of
horrifying sexual and psychological trauma", and was "suffering from a form ofpost-
traumatic stress disorder". The second concluded that her responses "were wholly
consistent with her having been the victim of abuse of the kind that she had described",
and that she had been in a state of "learned helplessness", unable as a result of this
abuse to "consider fully all the alternatives to remaining in the violent situation".
Medical evidence was also led, which was to the effect that Galbraith had been
suffering from a clinical depression towards the end of 1998.
The Crown did not accept Galbraith's plea of diminished responsibility and,
indeed, led evidence which was intended to show that her account of abuse was
untrue, and that the killing had been carefully planned and prepared. Evidence was
led to the effect that Galbraith had "carried out certain steps, both before and after
the killing, which were designed to suggest that the crime had been committed by
two intruders in the course of an attack in which she had been raped and her handbag
had been rifled".11 The jury, by a majority, convicted Galbraith of murder, and she
appealed against conviction to the High Court, arguing that the trial judge had
misdirected the jury on the defence of diminished responsibility.12 In June 2001, a
Full Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and authorised the Crown to
bring a new prosecution.
9 Homicide Act 1957, s 2.
10 See Prosecutor v Delalic and Others (IT-96-21), International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (Appeals Chamber), 20 February 2001.
11 Galbraith, at 956B-C.
12 The grounds of appeal included an issue relating to prejudicial publicity during the trial, but it was
unnecessary to deal with this point given that the court was prepared to allow the appeal on the
issue of diminished responsibility.
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C. HOW DOES DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY WORK?
Before turning to the grounds of decision, it may be helpful to examine briefly the
theoretical basis of diminished responsibility. It is, in many ways, analogous to
provocation. Both "defences" (if that is what they should be called)13 will, where
successfully pled, result in a conviction for culpable homicide rather than murder.14
They have no special relevance to any offence other than murder, although evidence
of provocation or diminished responsibility may be considered in mitigation of
sentence for other crimes.15
It has previously been common to talk about diminished responsibility and
provocation as "reducing" murder to culpable homicide. That terminology has,
however, been thrown into doubt by the recent Full Bench decision in Drury v HM
Advocate,16 where it was denied that provocation operates in this fashion. According
to the court in Drury, provocation is not a partial defence in this sense, but rather
evidence that the accused lacked the "wickedness" which is an integral part of the
mens rea of murder.
There are serious objections to the Drury analysis, which I have discussed
elsewhere.17 The important point for present purposes is that the Drury court
appeared to consider that its analysis was also applicable to the law of diminished
responsibility.18 And indeed, there is some historical support for the view that
diminished responsibility negates the mens rea of murder, as is noted in Galbraith.19
But equally, as is also noted in Galbraith, there is support for the view that diminished
responsibility is simply an extenuating circumstance, or a plea in mitigation.20 What
is curious about Galbraith is that, while the court notes these conflicting approaches
and concludes that "[the judges] had not really settled the precise nature of the plea
which they were describing",21 there is no attempt to explain how the point should
be settled, and no mention whatsoever of Drury.
13 Cf Lindsay v HM Advocate 1997 JC 19.
14 Or, it should be noted, a conviction for aggravated assault rather than attempted murder: Brady v
HM Advocate 1986 JC 68; HM Advocate v Blake 1986 SLT 661. But this cannot always be the case,
as it is possible to attempt to kill without committing an assault. The point, however, is perhaps
unlikely to arise in practice.
15 See, for example, Andrews v HM Advocate 1994 SCCR 190 (diminished responsibility, or something
close thereto); MacNeill v McTaggart (1976) SCCR Supp 150 at 151 (provocation).
16 2001 SLT 1013. The judgments in Drury were handed down more than five months prior to thejudgment in Galbraith, but were subject to a publication embargo pending Drury's retrial.
17 J Chalmers, "Collapsing the structure of criminal law" 2001 SLT (News) 241.
18 Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013 per Lord Justice-General Rodger at 1017, and per Lord
Nimmo Smith at 1031.
19 Galbraith, at 960J, citing HM Advocate v Tierney (1875) 3 Coup 152 per Lord Ardmillan at 166.
20 Galbraith, at 9601, citing Alex Dingwall (1867) 5 Irv 466 at 479-480. This is probably the better
view: see Lindsay v HM Advocate 1997 JC 19 per Lord Justice-General Hope at 21.
21 Galbraith, at 960H.
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The point may not matter very much, because the consequences of the Drury
analysis, which may remove the requirement for defences such as self-defence to be
based on reasonable grounds,22 have no application to diminished responsibility.
Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the Galbraith court does not address the manner
in which the defence of diminished responsibility functions—and indeed, reverts to
the former terminology (disapproved in Drury) ofmurder being "reduced" to culpable
homicide.23
D. THE KEY TO GALBRAITH
Prior to Galbraith, the accepted definition24 of diminished responsibility (and that
which was offered to the jury in Galbraith) was a portion of Lord Justice-Clerk
Alness' charge to the jury in HM Advocate v Savage:25
it has been put in this way: that there must be aberration or weakness of mind; that there
must be some form of mental unsoundness; that there must be a state of mind which is
bordering on, though not amounting to, insanity; that there must be a mind so affected
that responsibility is diminished from full responsibility to partial responsibility—in other
words, the prisoner in question must be only partially accountable for his actions. And I
think one can see running through the cases that there is implied
. . .
that there must be
some form of mental disease.26
The initial point raised by Galbraith is a simple one. Is Lord Alness' charge to
the jury to be regarded as laying down a series of cumulative criteria, all of which
must be met before the defence of diminished responsibility must be applied? Or is
it simply a series of alternatives? Recent decisions, primarily Connelly v HM
Advocate,27 had taken the view that Lord Alness' charge amounted to a series of
cumulative criteria—and, accordingly, the defence could not operate unless there
was evidence of mental disease.28 The trial judge in Galbraith had directed the jury
in accordance with this view.
However, as the Galbraith court recognises, that view is simply untenable.
The basis for the diminished responsibility defence which was pled in Savage
was the accused's extreme intoxication—something which, of course, would no
longer be recognised as a basis for the defence.29 Clearly, if Lord Alness had
22 See J Chalmers, "Collapsing the structure of criminal law" 2001 SLT (News) 241.
23 Galbraith, at 960I-J and 963D.
24 See, for example, Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, vol ] at 464; T H Jones and M G A Christie,
Criminal Law, 2nd edn (1996) at 224; RAA McCall Smith and D Sheldon, Scors Criminal Law,
2nd edn (1997) at 143.
25 1923 JC 49.
26 HM Advocate v Savage 1923 JC 49 at 51.
27 1990 JC 349.
28 In Connelly itself, the court referred to a "mental disorder or a mental illness or disease". It was
subsequently held, in Williamson v HM Advocate 1994 JC 149, that these terms should not be read
disjunctively, but were simply different expressions of the same concept.
29 Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38; Galbraith, at 9631.
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meant to say that a mental disease was always required as a basis for the defence,
there would have been no question of the defence being left to the jury in Savage.
Lord Alness was simply giving a series of examples of the "kind of thing" which
must be proven for the defence of diminished responsibility to operate—a point
which the Galbraith court demonstrates by identifying each of the earlier cases
from which the four examples given are drawn.30
The instinctive solution to this misinterpretation of Lord Alness' observations
might be simply to overrule Connelly and to hold that the four Savage "criteria"
are disjunctive, and that any one of them may be met in order for the defence to
succeed. That, however, would be unsatisfactory. First, they are a non-exhaustive
list of examples, rather than criteria (although they have been called "criteria" in
the past).31 Second, they are not satisfactory tests. The first—"aberration or weak-
ness of mind", or "some form of mental unsoundness"—gives no indication of how
severe the condition must be. The second—"borderline insanity"—is of little use
unless a real question of insanity has arisen at the trial,32 and there may well be
cases where a defence of diminished responsibility should succeed even though the
accused's condition does not approach insanity.33 The third—"responsibility is
diminished from full responsibility to partial responsibility"—is simply tautologous.34
The fourth—"some form of mental disease"—suffers from the same problem as
the first, in that it gives no indication of how serious the effects of the disease must
be.
The Galbraith court was, therefore, required to formulate a test to encapsulate
the essence of diminished responsibility, and came up with the following. The jury
must decide whether "by reason of the abnormality of mind in question, the ability
of the accused, as compared with a normal person, to determine or control his
actings was substantially impaired".35 One may, of course, question where this
terminology of "abnormality of mind" and "substantially impaired" comes from. It
does not appear to have direct roots in any earlier Scottish case, and the closest
equivalent which the Galbraith court finds is Lord Sands' reference to "great
peculiarity of mind" in Muir v HM Advocate.36 Rather, the terminology appears to
30 Galbraith, at 961B-D.
31 It is, perhaps, unhelpful that the Galbraith court continues to refer to them as "criteria" in the
paragraph heading at 961A-B, although the text of the judgment makes it clear that they are no
longer to be regarded as anything of the sort.
32 Cf Lindsay v HM Advocate 1997 JC 19, where the trial judge avoided this problem by directing the
jury as to the definition of insanity, although there was no suggestion of insanity in that case. The
trial judge's directions are not included in the Justiciary Cases report, but can be found in the Scots
Law Times: 1997 SLT 67 at 69.
33 See R v Seers (1984) 79 Cr App R 261, which is cited with approval in Galbraith.
34 Connelly v HM Advocate 1990 JC 349 per Lord Justice-General Hope at 358.
35 Galbraith, at 966G-H.
36 1933 JC 46 at 49.
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come (unacknowledged) from s 2 ofthe (English) Homicide Act 1957, which provides
as follows:
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of
murder ifhe was suffering from such abnormality ofmind (whether arising from a condition
of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease
or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in
doing or being a party to the killing.3'
Those wishing to rebut a charge of anglicisation may point to the fact that the
"normal person" is invoked as an appropriate comparator, unlike in the English
legislation. But that objection will not hold: the "normal person" differs little from
the "ordinary human beings" to which Lord Parker CJ alludes in the leading case of
R v Byrne.311
We can sum up the position as follows. The doctrine of diminished responsibility
has its origins in decisions of the Scottish courts in the nineteenth century. In 1957,
a version of the doctrine was imported into English law by statutory reform. In
2001, the High Court ofJusticiary, in a remarkable process ofcircularity, has imported
the English definition into Scots law.
There is, in all probability, little wrong with this. Diminished responsibility has,
in Scotland, long been a doctrine in search of a definition, and the English statutory
language might be considered as accurate a rendition of Scots law as any other.
After all, the language of s 2 of the Homicide Act was drafted in order to "introduce
into English law the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility".39 There could
have been little objection if the Galbraith court had simply taken the view that the
draftsman's job had been executed admirably40 and that the result should be taken
as expressing not only English, but also Scots law. However, it would have been
better if the use of the English phraseology had been acknowledged and explained
by the High Court, rather than hidden in a handful of oblique references.
E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMULATION
In essence, the consequences of the reformulation are rather straightforward. First,
the jury will be provided with clearer (although perhaps still rather unspecific)
guidance as to how severe the effects of the abnormality must be for the plea of
37 The Lord Justice-General does state, at 964E-F in Galbraith, that the requirement of "substantial
impairment" is "reflected" in the English legislation. That appears to be disingenuous, however.
The English legislation is the origin of this terminology, not a mirror image of it.
38 [1960] 2 QB 396, at 403. One can, it should be noted, find references to the "normal person" in both
R v Seers (1984) 79 Cr App R 261 andfl v Sprfggi [1958] 1 QB 279, two of the four English cases to
which the Galbraith judgment refers.
39 HC Debs 27 Nov 1956, col 318 (statement of the Attorney-General). See also HC Debs 15 Nov
1956, col 1153 (statement of the Home Secretary).
40 I.e. that he or she had accurately rendered the Scottish doctrine—not necessarily that this is how a
defence of diminished responsibility should ideally be defined.
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diminished responsibility to be successful, something which has up until now been
missing. Second, there is no longer any requirement that the "abnormality of mind"
be a mental illness, although it must be "recognised by the appropriate science".41 A
number of issues must still be noted, however.
(1) Limiting the recognised abnormalities
Notably, Lord Rodger does not adopt into Scots law the English proviso that the
abnormality ofmind must arise "from a condition ofarrested or retarded development
of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury". This proviso, most
obviously, excludes the transient effects of intoxication from the scope of the defence,42
and appears to achieve little else aside confusion amongst judges, juries, expert
witnesses and courts of appeal.43
Instead, Lord Rodger invokes a different limiting factor, stating that the court
may, for "policy reasons", exclude certain abnormalities of mind from the ambit of
the defence.44 Voluntary intoxication, therefore, is explicitly excluded,45 but this
suggests that involuntary intoxication could provide a sound foundation for a defence
of diminished responsibility where the accused's responsibility has been "substantially
impaired" but he or she lacks the "total alienation of reason" which is essential for
the defence of automatism.46 The policy issues involved, however, are not articulated
in Galbraith, although the reasons for excluding any defence ofvoluntary intoxication
have been discussed elsewhere.47
What is not explained in Galbraith is how these policy issues may be held to exclude
other conditions. The court explicitly excludes "psychopathic personality disorder"
from the scope of the defence for "policy reasons",48 citing Carraherv HM Advocate.49
This conclusion is, however, questionable. First, a simple assertion is made that
"psychologists and psychiatrists acknowledge the existence of a condition described
as psychopathic personality disorder", a statementwhich is highly dubious and probably
41 Galbraith, at 966D.
42 ft v Di Duca (1959) 43 Cr App R 167.
43 See R D Mackay, "The abnormality of mind factor in diminished responsibility" [t999] Crim LR
117; S Dell, Murder Into Manslaughter (1984), 38-40. But cf Prosecutor v Delalic (IT-96-21),
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Trial Chamber II), 16 November 1998,
at para 1166, where it is suggested that this proviso operates to exclude "killings motivated by
emotions, such as those of jealousy, rage or hate". It would, however, be mischievous to suggest
that, because this proviso has not been incorporated into Scots law by Galbraith, such motivations
might provide a foundation for a defence of diminished responsibilty.
44 Galbraith, at 963H-K and 966E-F.
45 Galbraith, at 963H-I and 966E-F.
46 Cardie v Mulrainey 1992 SLT 1152, applying Ross v HM Advocate 1991 JC 210. This might be more
of a problem for the English courts: cf R v O'Connell [1997] Crim LR 683.
47 Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38; Ross v HM Advocate 1991 JC 210.
48 Galbraith, at 963I-K.
49 1946 JC 108.
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simply incorrect.50 Second, Carraher does not, on the face of it, conclusively rule out
the use of such a disorder as a foundation for a defence of diminished responsibility,
as the Faculty of Advocates (in evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment), Lord Keith, and Professor T B Smith have all pointed out before now.51
Third, there is no attempt to identify what the "policy reasons" for excluding this
condition are. They are not explained in Carraher, and neither the English courts,
the Law Commission, nor the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment appear to
have had any difficultywith the idea that a defence ofdiminished responsibility might
be founded upon such a condition.52 For all these reasons, it is to be hoped that the
comments in Galbraith regarding psychopathy will be regarded as obiter, and will
not preclude re-examination of the issue at a future date.
(2) The interaction with other defences
There are three other issues related to the defence of diminished responsibility
which are not directly raised in Galbraith but which will probably have to be addressed
by the High Court at some point in the future. Limitations of space preclude a full
exploration of these points here, but they may be briefly identified as follows: first, if
voluntary intoxication cannot provide a foundation for a defence of diminished
responsibility, how should the courts deal with an abnormality of mind which has
been exacerbated by voluntary intoxication?53 Second, can abnormalities of mind be
attributed to the "ordinary person" for the purposes of the objective test in defences
such as provocation, self-defence or coercion?54 Third, if diminished responsibility
can now be founded on an "abnormality of mind", rather than the more restrictive
criterion of "mental illness", does the same apply to insanity?55
50 Psychopathic personality is not included in the two major international classifications of mental
disorders (ICD-10 and DSM-IV), and the Royal College of Psychiatrists has recently recommended
that in most contexts, the use of the term should be abandoned. See Royal College of Psychiatrists,
Offenders With Personality Disorder (Council Report CR71: 1999), at 11. See also the Report of
the Committee of Inquiry into the Ashworth Special Hospital (Cmnd 4194-2: 1999), at para 6.5.1("considerable agreement" that "psychopathic disorder" is a "redundant term").
51 Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1950), Q 5628;
Keith of Avonholm, "Some observations on diminished responsibility" 1959 JR 109 at 115; T B
Smith, "Diminished responsibility" [1957] Crim LR 354 at 359. See also HM Advocate v Gordon(1967) 31 journal of Criminal Law 270.
52 See J E Hall Williams, "The psychopath and the defence of diminished responsibility" (1958) 21
MLR 544; R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com No 177,
1989), clause 56 of Draft Criminal Code Bill; Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment(Cmd 8932: 1953), at 139.
53 See Carraher v HM Advocate 1946 JC 108; HM Advocate v McLeod 1956 JC 20; G R Sullivan,
"Intoxicants and diminished responsibility" [1994] Crim LR 156.
54 Cf Cochrane v HM Advocate, High Court of Justiciary (on appeal), 13 June 2001 (available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/). I have discussed this issue briefly elsewhere: J Chalmers, "Redefining
provocation" (2001) 53 Greens Criminal Law Bulletin 2 at 3.
55 See, for example, MacLeod v Mathteson 1993 SCCR 488 (hypoglycaemia), and Finegan v
Heywood 2000 JC 444 (somnambulism). Are these properly dealt with as instances of insanity or as
automatism?
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F. CONCLUSION
The Galbraith judgment is a curious document. On the one hand, the detail of the
analysis is highly impressive, and well informed by historical study. There is little
doubt that, in establishing that diminished responsibility need not be founded on a
"mental illness", the High Court has reached a valuable and correct result. On the
other hand, it is also a disappointing opinion, which fails to address the theoretical
basis of the doctrine of diminished responsibility, borrows from an English statute
without acknowledgement or explanation, and includes questionable statements
regarding psychopathy. Most importantly, however—and regardless of one's views




(The author is indebted to Professor Christopher Gane and Margaret Ross for their
advice. The usual caveats apply.)
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Effusa vel deiecta in Rome and Glasgow
A. INTRODUCTION
Little can be so fascinating to the student of Roman law as seeing it being applied or
at least invoked in modern practice, as it still is in a limited number of countries,
Scotland amongst them. This article considers a recent Scots case, McDyer v The
Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd,1 in which a relatively obscure area of Roman
law, involving the fundamental division between fault-based and strict liability, was
considered.
The facts of the case are fairly simple. In 1990, a sports event, the European
Summer Special Olympic Games, took place in Celtic football stadium in Glasgow.
The opening ceremony was held on 21 July 1990, and Colin McDyer was among the
crowd. While he was seated in the stand, a piece ofwood fell on his hand and wounded
him. The wood had come loose from a temporary construction attached to the roof
of the stadium.
McDyer raised an action against Celtic Football Club, as the owners of the
stadium, against the organisers of the event, European Summer Special Olympic
1 2000 SC 379. This article was originally presented as a paper at the IV Congreso Internacional y VII
Iberoamericano de Derecho Romano, Burgos 1-3 February 2001, and a Spanish version will be
published in the Acta of this congress. The author wishes to thank those who contributed to the
discussion on the paper at that congress, and also Professor Hector MacQueen who originally provided
a copy of the case report of McDyer.
